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I. Introduction
Before the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, an overwhelming majority of countries in the world had fixed exchange rate regimes. Latin American countries were no exception to this rule. Prior to 1973, the percentage of countries with fixed regimes was greater than 90%. Since then, however, Latin American countries present a wide variety of experiences with regards to their exchange rate regimes, and, more generally, their exchange rate policy. Different countries, at different times, have adopted their exchange regimes in search of different objectives, such as inflation control, reduced exchange rate volatility, or improved competitiveness. Table 1 illustrates the shift away from fixed regimes in Latin American countries.
In this paper, we explore whether political economy factors have been important determinants of exchange rate policy in Latin America. One way in which we do this is by studying the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in Latin America, placing special emphasis on political, institutional and interest group explanations. The presumption is that differences in institutional and political settings, as well as differences in economic structure, can have an effect on the choice of regime and, more generally, on exchange rate policy. In addition to these structural elements, we examine whether certain political events, such as elections and changes in government, affect the pattern of nominal and real exchange rates.
We find evidence that political economy factors are indeed important for the determination of the exchange rate regime. Governments with strong support in the legislature tend to choose fixed regimes, as do governments that face a fragmented opposition. This is consonant with the idea that sustaining a fixed rate may require politically difficult adjustment. Economies with an important manufacturing sector are more prone to adopt either floating regimes or backward-looking crawling pegs, both of which tend to deliver more competitive exchange rates. The influence of the manufacturing sector on the exchange regime appears more important in periods where trade was liberalized, so that this sector had to face the competition of foreign producers. We also find strong evidence that major political events such as elections and government changes affect the path of nominal and real exchange rates. More specifically, devaluations tend to be delayed in the run-up to elections, and only occur immediately after the new government takes office.
The paper is organized as follows: In sections 2 through 5, we analyze the political economy of the choice of exchange rate regime. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the literature of exchange rate regime choice. Section 3 discusses our classification of exchange rate arrangements, and introduces our left-hand side variable. In section 4, we discuss the economic, political, institutional and interest group explanatory variables. Section 5 discusses our empirical findings. Our analysis of the pattern of exchange rates around elections and government changes is covered in sections 6 and 7. In section 6 we introduce the subject and the relevant literature, and in section 7 we present our findings. Finally, section 8 concludes.
Political economy determinants of the choice of regime
Traditionally, explanations of exchange rate policy built on the optimal currency area and related approaches.
2 Scholars focused on how different exchange rate regimes might be desirable for countries with different economic characteristics, and investigated the impact of these characteristics on policy choice. 3 Findings indicated a tendency for small open economies facing few external price shocks to fix rather than float, but they were typically weak and contradictory.
More recently, attention shifted to the potential credibility effects of exchange rate policy. Specifically, it was argued that governments could gain anti-inflationary credibility by fixing to a nominal anchor currency Pagano 1989, Weber 1991) . This constitutes an easily observable target, and deviating from it may impose greater costs on policymakers than deviating from a monetary target. In addition, some authors argued that a fixed exchange rate disciplines the government because any fiscal excess might end in a currency collapse. 4 While there is little systematic empirical evidence on this score, it has no doubt played a role in many Latin American experiences in the 1990s.
A weakness of these approaches is that they tended to assume a benevolent social welfare-maximizing government. This is problematic for two reasons. First, there is no consensus on welfare criteria for exchange rate regime choice, so that even such a benevolent government might face strongly conflicting advice from experts. Second, and perhaps more important, the assumption of such a benevolent government seems hard to justify on theoretical or empirical grounds. We have little reason to believe that currency policy is made any differently -that is, any less politically -than other economic policies.
In this light, a new generation of investigations of exchange rate policy explicitly incorporates political economy variables. Some studies on developed countries, especially in Europe, have looked at the impact of institutional, electoral, and interest-group factors on currency policy (Bernhard and Leblang 1997; Blomberg and Hess 1997; Eichengreen 1995; Frieden 1994 Frieden , 1998 Hefeker 1997 are some examples). Apart from the possibility that studies of OECD economies, most prominently of European monetary integration, may have limited applicability to the developing world, the literature is far from a consensus on the sorts of political and political economy variables expected to affect currency policy.
Some recent studies have included developing countries in the analysis of the political economy of exchange rate policy. Collins (1996) and Edwards (1996) , who use probit analysis to study the 2 See for example Mundell (1961 ), McKinnon (1962 ), and Kenen (1969 ; A modern survey is Tarlas (199 ). 3 A useful survey is Edison and Melvin (1990) . 4 See Aghevli et al, (1991) . Tornell and Velasco (1995) argue against this logic, pointing out that under fixed exchange rates politicians with a high discount rate will be more prone to fiscal excesses, as the inflationary costs of such excesses are paid at a later date.
determinants of exchange rate regime, build their empirical models around a framework in which the political cost associated with devaluation under fixed exchange rates plays a major role. Depreciation under more flexible regimes is less visible and, it is assumed, does not carry the same stigma. They tend to find that factors that increase the need for frequent adjustment or, in the case of Edwards, increase the political cost of readjustment, reduce the likelihood that a country will fix. While Collins does not directly use political economy variables in her analysis, Edwards introduces variables that measure the degree of political instability, and the strength of government. He finds that weaker governments and unstable political environments reduce the likelihood that a peg will be adopted.
Other authors, such as Klein and Marion (1994) and Gavin and Perotti (1997) have looked at the effects of political events such as elections or government changes on the timing of devaluations or changes in regime. The general conclusion of these studies is that devaluations, or shifts from fixed to more flexible regimes, tend to be delayed until after these events take place. Stein and Streb (1998b) have provided a political budget cycle model that explains these delays.
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The present study examines a wide range of economic, political economy, and political variables that might affect exchange rate policy. It contributes to the literature in both analytical and empirical ways. First, it uses a richer and more realistic classification of exchange rate regimes than the usual fixed/flexible dichotomy. Second, it examines closely the impact of interest group variables, a factor overlooked in much previous work. 6 Third, it looks at a large number of Latin American and Caribbean countries over a relatively long period of time (between 1960 and 1994) . Finally, it uses new data on political institutions, based on the composition of legislatures.
Exchange rate arrangements: a discussion
Countries do not choose regimes for the regime per se. Different regimes produce different outcomes, and countries choose them according to the outcomes they desire. We can think of three values among which policymakers must make tradeoffs in choosing their exchange rate arrangement: credibility, flexibility, and stability. Implicit in the discussion that follows is the assumption that governments do have the ability to affect the level of the real exchange rate, at least in the short and medium term, through the use of exchange rate policy. This assumption is supported by the findings of the literature on purchasing power parity, which shows that deviations from PPP are very slow to die out.
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Governments might choose to adopt fixed exchange rates in the hope of gaining credibility in their fight against inflation, as mentioned above. The use of a fixed exchange rate as a commitment technology to control inflation has become common, and clearly responds to the needs of some governments some of the time. At the same time, fixing the exchange rate may provide stability in a price of great importance to local economic agents. This is especially the case in very open economies, in which exchange rate volatility may have substantial costs in and of itself (especially in the absence of well-developed forward markets).
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Fixed exchange rates, however, give up the third value, flexibility, which can have consequences both for internal and external balance. On the domestic front, fixed exchange rates entail the loss of the ability to use monetary policy to react to real shocks. This loss of flexibility, according to the theory of optimal currency areas, should be more problematic if shocks in the country that pegs are uncorrelated to those in the country to which the currency is pegged. A recent study by Hausmann, Gavin, Pages and Stein (1999) suggests, however, that flexible exchange rate countries in Latin America have not made use of this flexibility to conduct anticyclical monetary policy. Quite on the contrary, monetary policy in Latin America has been for the most part procyclical.
Regarding the external balance, a drawback of fixed exchange rates is that an inflation differential between the pegging country and the anchor generates an appreciation of the real exchange rate that, in the absence of compensating productivity gains, hurts and might generate a balance of payments crisis. Flexibility is indeed potentially valuable to a government that is unwilling to forgo the use of nominal depreciations for policy purposes. Perhaps the most common such purpose among developing countries is to restore or ensure the competitiveness of its tradable producers. Sachs (1985) indeed associates the greater success of East Asia relative to Latin America during the debt crisis of the early 1980s with the propensity of the former to maintain "more realistic" (i.e. weaker) exchange rates than the latter, thus encouraging the production of exportables. Interestingly, he attributes this policy difference to interest group effects.
The benefits and costs of fixed exchange rates depend on the characteristics of the country in question. For example, concern about both credibility and competitiveness should be affected by existing levels of inflation, albeit in different ways. A country with extremely high inflation, desperate to stabilize, might be more likely to use a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor for expectations, that is for credibility purposes. On the other hand, the higher the rate of inflation -perhaps below some hyperinflationary threshold -the more a fixed rate will impose competitive pressures on tradables producers and, more generally, pressures on the balance of payments.
Given the history of high inflation in Latin America, we believe that this tradeoff between credibility and competitiveness is especially important.
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And the degree to which policymakers opt to sacrifice competitiveness to credibility, or vice versa, will presumably be a function of a variety of political economy variables. These might include the existence of other credibility-enhancing mechanisms, popular pressures to reduce inflation, and the political influence of tradables producers.
There is a set of countries included in our study for which exchange rate stability considerations may be especially important. In particular, most Caribbean countries do not share the history of inflation of the rest of Latin America. In addition, these island countries are very small and very open, so that a nominal devaluation is rapidly translated into more inflation, and is less effective in restoring competitiveness (given that a large portion of the inputs are tradable). In these cases, the inflation-competitiveness trade-off may not be as relevant. Exchange rate policy is not very effective, low inflation makes a fixed rate easier to sustain and trade is rather concentrated with the United States. Given the small size of local currency markets, which make it more difficult to hedge the risk of holding local currency, the reduction of exchange rate volatility may be a more important consideration in these economies.
In most of Latin America, the credibility-competitiveness tradeoff is central to the political economy of exchange rate policy. For this reason, this is the main trade-off we have in mind as we define the left-hand side variables to be used in our empirical analysis. At the same time, the desire for nominal and real exchange rate stability may sometimes matter. Our classification of regimes is flexible enough to allow organizing the regime variable along the stability vs. flexibility dimension, if desired.
Most studies of the determinants of exchange regimes, including Collins (1996) and Edwards (1996) 10 This classification has some unfortunate consequences. For example, Mexico before the tequila is classified as Αmore flexible≅. So are the tablitas of the Southern Cone countries in the late 1970s. Yet, within the inflation-competitiveness trade-off that underlies these authors= work, these cases are clearly attempts to lower inflation or keep it at bay, even at the cost of accepting a larger misalignment from the target exchange rate. Cottarelli and Giannini (1998) have recently expanded on the IMF classification, including a special category for forward-looking crawling pegs such as the tablitas. We think this is a step in the right direction. Here, we go a step further, taking advantage of the fact that, while the IMF classification is not dissagregated enough for our purposes, the descriptions that appear in Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions are detailed enough to allow a reclassification. Here, we distinguish among the following regimes: 12 1.
Pegged to single currency 2.
Pegged to basket of currencies 3.
Pegged with frequent adjustments (sustained less than 6 months) 4.
Forward looking crawling pegs (such as the tablitas) 5.
Forward looking crawling bands 6.
Backward looking crawling pegs 7.
Backward looking crawling bands 10 Edwards also tries including the limited flexibility cases together with the fixed, with no change in his results.
Managed floating 9.
Free floating This classification described above allows us to capture, by grouping the different categories in different ways, different dimensions related to the exchange rate regime. For the credibility vs. competitiveness dimension, we grouped these nine categories into the following four groups: fixed (which includes fixed to single currency, to basket of currencies and fixed with frequent adjustments); forward looking crawling pegs and bands; backward looking crawling pegs and bands; and flexible (including free and managed floating).
In order to discuss how these groups should be ordered in the credibility vs. competitiveness dimension, it is useful to look first at some of the outcomes associated with each of them. Table 2 presents, in the first row, the mean of the real exchange rate for each of these four groups. 13 To make the comparison meaningful, the real exchange rate in each country was normalized to average 100 throughout the period. The second row presents the average rate of change of the real exchange rate under each group, and the third row presents the average annualized rate of inflation.
The results in table 2 allow us to order the different groups on the credibility-competitiveness dimension. The forward-looking group appears at the credibility (or anti-inflation) end of the spectrum. This exchange regime is associated with the most appreciated rate (an average real exchange rate of 90.3). It also produces, on average, an annual appreciation of 6.3 %. For comparison, under the fixed regime the average real exchange rate was 97.4, and the rate of appreciation was 1.5%. The fixed is associated with the lowest average inflation. This should not be surprising, as the forward looking is usually implemented only when inflation is high enough that a peg would not be sustained.
The fact that the forward-looking regimes are the ones that tend to deliver the most appreciated and appreciating real exchange rates should not come as a surprise either. Countries fix their exchange rates for a variety of reasons, only one of which is to provide a credible and visible target to fight against inflation. Low inflation, small and very open economies with geographically concentrated trade, such as most Caribbean countries, may choose to fix in order to stabilize real or nominal exchange rates. In these cases, a fixed exchange rate need not cost the country that adopts it a loss of competitiveness. Forward looking crawling pegs such as the tablitas, however, are unmistakably meant to bring inflation under control, and since the exchange rate is used as a nominal anchor for inflation, this inflation objective comes at the expense of an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and loss of international competitiveness.
At the other extreme of the trade-off we place the backward looking regimes. These are the regimes associated with the most depreciated rate, 109.0, compared to 106.0 for the flexible regimes. The larger rate of depreciation under flexible suggests that these regimes are sometimes implemented immediately after balance of payments crises, following an appreciated exchange rate, while backward looking regimes are usually put in place when the exchange rate is already depreciated, to keep its level competitive. In our view, a backward looking crawling peg, adjusting according to inflation differential, is a more active policy to maintain competitiveness than flexible regimes, which, at least in the extreme case of free floating, represent in a way the absence of a choice along this trade-off.
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The appropriate technique when working with multinomial discrete dependent variables, when one has reasons to expect a certain ordering of the groups, is ordered logit. Following the above discussion, in most of the empirical tests we will work with a left hand side variable, REGIME, which takes the following values: 0
Forward looking crawl and bands 1 Fixed (to single currency, basket, or frequent adj.) 2 Floating (managed or independent) 3 Backward looking crawl and band.
The potential determinants of exchange regimes
Many different factors can affect the choice of regime of a country. In this section, we discuss the explanatory variables considered in our empirical analysis. For presentational purposes, we divide the discussion in four parts, covering macroeconomic and external variables; institutional variables; interest group variables; and political variables.
Macroeconomic, external and structural variables
We expect that inflation will have an important effect on the exchange rate regime. High inflation makes a peg unsustainable, and even moderate inflation will require frequent readjustments of the peg. Under the assumption of a political cost of abandoning the peg, inflation increases the probability of incurring this cost, and decreases the likelihood of choosing a fixed regime. High inflation should not discourage, however, the adoption of forward looking crawling pegs, such as the tablitas. On the contrary, high inflation increases the gains from credibility that nominal anchors provide, and the forward-looking pegs can provide this nominal anchor function without making the regime unsustainable.
In our empirical analysis, we use the log of inflation, since we do not expect the effects to be linear, and we lag the variable one period to avert potential endogeneity problems, as the regime can have an effect on contemporaneous inflation. In addition to the log of inflation, we use a dummy variable (HYPER) which takes a value of 1 when inflation rate is greater than 1000 percent. This variable captures the fact that it may be easier to stabilize prices by fixing the exchange rate starting from a hyperinflation, as compared with moderate or high inflation. Under hyperinflation, the nominal exchange rate becomes a natural reference for prices, and this makes it easier to stop the inertial component of inflation by pegging the exchange rate. We expect that, controlling for inflation, a hyperinflation will increase the likelihood of adopting a peg.
Another factor that affects the sustainability of fixed exchange rate regimes is the availability of foreign reserves. Lack of reserves increases the probability of adjusting or abandoning the peg, and thus the probability of incurring the political cost of doing so. Rather than the more traditional measure of reserves in terms of months of imports, we use (RESM2), the ratio of central bank reserves over money supply (M2). 15 Since the effects of reserves are likely to be non-linear, as an alternative we use a dummy variable (RESERVESD) that takes a value of 1 when the ratio of reserves over M2 is below a critical threshold. 16 We expect a high value of reserves to be associated with fixed regimes, and reserves below the threshold to be associated with more flexible arrangements. Due to possible endogeneity problems, both variables are lagged in the regressions.
We expect that more open economies will tend to adopt fixed exchange rates, for several reasons. First, the more open the economy, the larger the potential cost of exchange rate volatility. Second, in more open economies domestic monetary shocks are more easily channeled abroad, so there is less need for an autonomous monetary policy. Third, in more open economies, the law of one price is more likely to operate. In this context of more flexible prices, one of the advantages of floating exchange rates --that they allow changes in real exchange rates when prices are sticky --fades away. Fourth, commitment to fixed exchange rates may become more credible in open economies since, in a context of flexible prices, governments will be less able to engineer a real devaluation through a nominal devaluation. In other words, devaluations become less effective as a means of achieving internal or external balance, and so the temptation to devalue becomes weaker. In the empirical analysis, we include an indicator of openness, measured as imports plus exports as a share of GDP, and we expect it to have a negative sign. 17 It is expected that countries that are subject to significant external shocks are more likely to adopt more flexible regimes. To measure the importance of external shocks we use the coefficient of variation of the terms of trade for the whole period (COVATOT). The lack of monthly data on the terms of trade prevented us from constructing a variable for the volatility of the terms of trade that can change over time, in response to changes in the structure of imports and exports that may occur in a country over an extended period such as the one considered here. The effects of the terms of trade shocks should be more severe for more open economies. For this reason, we also consider our measure of terms of trade volatility interacted with openness.
18 Collins (1996) Edwards (1996) uses the rate of international reserves to the monetary base. Data on reserves and M2 come from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. 16 We defined this threshold as the mean of the ratio minus the standard deviation. 17 The data comes from the Economic and Social Database of the IDB. 18 Notice that the variation within countries of this interactive term comes solely from variations in openness. The volatility of terms of trade was measured for the whole period in each country. This would only be a problem for those countries which significantly altered the composition of their trade during the period under consideration. drawback of this measure is that it assumes a linear trend in the climate of ideas. As an alternative, here we use a variable --VIEWS --which measures the percentage of countries in the world under fixed exchange regimes. The data for the construction of this variable comes from Goldfajn and Valdez (1996) . VIEWS is expected to enter the regressions with a negative sign.
Institutional variables
An institutional variable that could have an effect on the exchange regime is the degree of central bank independence. However, it is not clear in which direction central bank independence should affect the regime. In countries where the central bank is in charge of exchange rate policy, an independent central bank that pursues the objective of price stability may be more prone to tie their own hands by adopting a fixed exchange regime. On the other hand, central bank independence may be seen as an alternative to a peg as a means to provide credibility. 19 As a measure of central bank independence, we used the index of legal independence developed by Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) , which includes criteria such as appointment, dismissal and terms of office of the governor, the objectives of the central bank, and limitations on its ability to lend to the public sector. One problem we face when using this variable is that it is available for half of the countries in the sample.
Interest group variables
One of the contributions of the present paper is that it explores the impact of sectoral interest groups, an issue that has been overlooked in previous work. Probably this neglect is due to the difficulty associated with understanding the preferences of the different interest groups, and finding good variables to capture the influence that these groups may have on policymakers. In addition, it is often believed that exchange rate policy has broad effects on the population, rather than specific effects on different groups. In contrast, trade policy has long been recognized as having important distributional effects. Even though we recognize that the role of interest groups may be stronger in trade policy, our hypothesis is that different groups have very different preferences regarding exchange rate policy, and that they can play a role in the choice of regime. In addition we contend that, as countries advance in the process of trade liberalization, this role becomes more fundamental. This hypothesis is supported by some of the country studies related to this project. 20 While an array of subsidies and specific tariffs are available to compensate those who are hurt by the exchange rate policy in place, special interest groups tend to concentrate their demands on these specific measures. However, as liberalization makes these compensatory mechanisms less available, these groups become vocal about exchange rate policy.
It stands to reason that tradables producers should favor a regime that avoids a real appreciation. This should be true both of producers of goods for exports, whose (domestic-currency) earnings are higher the weaker the exchange rate, and of import-competers. However, there are many potential complications to this simple expectation. One has to do with the price of inputs: firms that use a high proportion of tradables in general, and imports in particular, get less benefit from a depreciation. Many mining firms, for example, use extremely high shares of imported inputs. These firms may be indifferent to the local exchange rate. Similarly, some firms or sectors may care less about the exchange rate to the extent that they have international market power and/or the demand for their product is inelastic. The most important (perhaps only) Latin American example is that of coffee growers while the International Coffee Agreement was in force. For them, the principal decision variable was the world price of coffee.
Perhaps the most important peculiarity in trying to think about sectoral interests in Latin American currency policy is the role of trade policy, and especially the very high levels of trade protection prevailing in most of the region until the middle 1980s. Where trade barriers to finished manufactured goods were prohibitive, as they were in much of the region from the 1940s until the 1980s, many manufacturers were essentially in nontradable production. They were relatively indifferent to the impact of the exchange rate on their output prices, as they were sheltered by barriers to trade. Even more, some of them preferred a strong (appreciated) real exchange rate, which made imported inputs -machinery, intermediates, raw materials, spare parts, borrowing -cheaper in local currency terms. There is in fact substantial anecdotal evidence that Latin American industrialists in the importsubstituting industrialization (ISI) period tended to support appreciated real exchange rates.
In our empirical tests, we include three different variables representing different tradable sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and mining. In light of the discussion above, we expect the agricultural sector to favor pro-competitiveness regimes (i.e, enter the regressions with a positive sign); we expect the mining sector to be indifferent; and we expect the manufacturing sector to support more flexible regimes when trade is liberalized, and to be indifferent when operating in highly protected markets. For lack of a better indicator of the lobbying power of each group, we simply assume that their influence on policymakers is proportional to their share in the country's GDP. Due to concerns about endogeneity (for example, there may be a shift to nontradable production under an appreciated exchange rate), these variables (AGRIL, MININGL and MANUFL) are lagged one period.
We developed two methods to deal with the change in the preferences of the manufacturing sector as trade becomes liberalized. First, we constructed a dummy variable (TARIFFD) to pick up the cases of liberalized trade. In constructing this variable, we faced the problem of the lack of good databases on tariffs and other barriers with the coverage we needed in terms of countries and years. We were able to gather, from different sources, data on average tariffs for 21 of the 26 countries in our sample, but in most cases data starts only in 1985, and in the best cases in 1980.
21 The criterion we used was to assign a value of 1 to cases where the average tariff was lower than 20%. In choosing this threshold, we took into account the fact that during the period of ISI, tariffs for final goods were much higher than those for intermediate inputs and capital goods. An average tariff of 20% generally implies a higher tariff for final goods, and an even higher effective rate of protection. For those years where we did not have data available, we completed the series using information on dates of trade reform in Edwards (1994) , and on the basis of our knowledge of the countries. We then interacted this dummy with our measure of manufacturing's importance, expecting the coefficient for the interactive term to be positive --i.e., in more liberal, low trade barrier periods, manufacturers would support exchange rate policies associated with greater attention to competitiveness --and the coefficient for MANUFL to be insignificant (indicating indifference about the regime) during highly protected periods.
Second, given the weaknesses associated with our trade liberalization variable, we divided the sample in 1985, into what might be thought of as "ISI" and "post-ISI" periods. Following the logic of the previous paragraph, we expect manufacturing to have no effects during the first period and positive effects after 1985.
Political Variables
We included two variables which were constructed using data on the composition of the legislature, obtained from the Nohlen's Enciclopedia Electoral Latinoamericana: the share of government seats in the legislature (GOVSEATS), and the effective number of parties in the legislature (EFPART). 22 We expect GOVSEATS to have a negative sign for a couple of reasons, associated with the political cost of devaluing or abandoning a tablita. First, a higher share of seats means that the government faces less political competition, so a readjustment may be less costly. In addition, a stronger government may be in a better position to implement the necessary measures to prevent an exchange 21 Data on average tariffs was provided by Alan Winters, of the Trade Division in the World Bank, and by Antoni Estevadeordal, of the Integration Division of the IDB. The series have some holes, and do not always coincide when they include information for the same countries. 22 One problem with GOVSEATS is that we don't always know about the coalitions in Congress. Where we did know, we counted the share corresponding to the coalition, not just that of the party of the president). rate adjustment. This last idea is consistent with the findings of the literature on political economy of fiscal policy, which suggests that stronger governments are associated with lower deficits.
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The effective number of parties is generally used to measure the fragmentation of the party system.
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On its own, we do not have a clear prior of how this variable would affect exchange rate policy, except for the fact that where fragmentation is greater, the government will probably have a smaller share of seats in the legislature. 25 As an indicator of the strength of government, the share of government seats is obviously much better. However, the effective number of parties has a simple interpretation once the share of government seats is accounted for: it measures the fragmentation of the opposition. Therefore, we expect the effects of the effective number of parties in the legislature to have a similar effects as the share of government seats. A weaker and more fragmented opposition diminishes the political cost of a devaluation, and at the same time it is easier for the government to achieve a winning coalition in support of the adjustment programs necessary to sustain a peg.
As an alternative to GOVSEATS, we created a dummy variable (MAJORITY) which takes a value of 1 whenever the government has more than 50% of the seats in the lower house. 26 The expectations here are similar to those for GOVSEATS. In addition, we expect the effective number of parties to be more important whenever the government does not control a majority of seats. For this reason, we interact EFPART with MINORITY (defined as 1-MAJORITY) to in order to be able to test this conjecture.
We include a measure of political instability (POLINST), which measures the number of changes in government per year. More unstable political systems have been associated with larger government deficits, so we expect this variable to have a positive coefficient, indicating that more unstable systems will make it more difficult for the government to sustain a peg. Finally, we included a dummy for 23 See for example Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Edin and Ohlsson (1991) , among others. 24 The effective number of parties is defined as EFPART = 1/∑s i 2 , where s i is the proportion of representatives party i has in the lower (or single) house. 25 These two variables are in fact highly correlated. 26 Each of these variables have advantages and disadvantages. While MAJORITY captures the nonlinearity of the problem, GOVSEATS captures the fact that 5% and 35% represent a very different situation in terms of the ability of the government to pass key legislation through Congress, in particular when the opposition is fairly fragmented. dictatorship based on the variable "democracy" from the Polity III database. 27 The expected sign of this variable is not clear. On the one hand, dictatorships could be more prone to choose fixed regimes, as the political cost of devaluing should be smaller for de facto governments. On the other hand, dictatorships tend to be comparatively more attuned to interest groups, from whom they derive rents, and less to the population at large, as they do not need to buy their votes. 27 The Polity III variable is an index which takes values from 0 to 10, and captures the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the existence of constraints on the power of the executive. Here, we use the dummy DICT, which takes a value of 1 when the index of democracy is 3 or below. The results of our ordered logit regressions are presented in table 4. We begin by using only macroeconomic/external variables as regressors, some of which, as discussed in the previous section, may be given a political economy interpretation associated to the political cost of a devaluation. In the rest of the regressions we introduce, in turn, our, institutional, interest group, and political variables. The last regression in the table is our preferred one, incorporating all the variables that seem to matter most.
Empirical analysis
Macroeconomic/external factors: The log of inflation (lagged) has the expected sign in all regressions, although it is not always significant. An increase in inflation is associated with a smaller probability of fixing. One could argue that high inflation makes a peg unsustainable. A political economy interpretation of this result is that, by making the peg less sustainable, high inflation increases the chances that politically costly adjustments to the peg will have to be made more frequently. 28 The hyperinflation dummy is significant in most regressions, and has a negative sign. This is consistent with the view that it is easier to get out of a hyperinflation by providing a nominal anchor than it is to stabilize prices in this way under moderate or high inflation, as during hyperinflations the nominal exchange rate becomes a natural reference for prices. Surprisingly, the reserves/m2 dummy, which takes a value of 1 when this ratio is below a critical level, did not come out significant. The critical value we used was the mean of the reserve ratio minus the standard deviation, which left less than 6% of the observations below the critical value. 29 It was not the case that countries with very low reserves were less likely to adopt a fixed or forward looking regime, a result that is puzzling. Similarly puzzling is the effect of the volatility of the terms of trade (COVATOT). Countries subject to strong external shocks were expected to prefer more flexible regimes, yet the coefficient came out negative and significant. We do have some concerns about measurement of this volatility. We used a variable that adopts the same value for the whole period in each country, ignoring the fact that many countries have substantially altered the composition of exports and imports during the sample period. When we used the interaction of the coefficient of variation of terms of trade and openness in place of COVATOT, the coefficient was still negative, but not significant.
Two variables which are consistently highly significant in all regressions are openness and VIEWS. As expected, both variables have negative and significant coefficients. Very similar results were obtained when a time trend was used in place of the VIEWS variable.
Institutional factors: The coefficient for central bank independence, measured by the legal index of independence (which is included in regression 2) had a negative sign, suggesting that countries with a higher degree of CBI tend to choose their exchange regime placing more weight on the inflation objective. The coefficient, however, was not significant.
Interest group factors:
In column 3 we present the regression where all three tradable sectors are included. As expected, the share of mining in GDP was not significant, since mining generally is a highly capital intensive activity with a large proportion of imported inputs. Contrary to our priors, the share of agriculture in GDP did not have a significant effect on the choice of regime either. One possible explanation is that the share in GDP is an imperfect indicator of the lobbying power of this sector, more so than in the other sectors studied. This could be the case due to the important heterogeneity found across countries in terms of the composition of the agricultural sector. While in some countries this sector is composed mainly of very small farms, whose owners are not organized as a group, in others the sector is highly concentrated, and the landowners are a strong class with important influence on government policy.
The most interesting results are those associated with the share of manufacturing in GDP. Economies with a larger share of manufacturing tended to choose more flexible, pro-competitiveness regimes. In addition, the hypothesis that the manufacturing sector cares more about exchange rate policy when trade is fairly liberalized, rather than under highly protected environments, is confirmed by our results. When we interacted the manufactures variable with our low tariff dummy, the share of manufactures becomes less significant, and the coefficient for the interactive term is positive and significant (regression 4). When we divided the sample into two periods, the coefficient for the share of manufactures was not significant during the period ending in 1984 (regression 5), characterized by high rates of protection, but was highly significant for the second period (regression 6), during which most countries were liberalizing trade flows.
Political factors: Both the share of government seats in the legislature and the effective number of parties had negative and significant coefficients. This confirms our priors that strong governments tend to fix, as do governments with a weak opposition. Our interpretation is that government strength relative to the opposition diminishes the political cost associated with devaluation, and at the same time makes the need for a devaluation less likely, as it is easier for the government to achieve a winning coalition in support of the necessary adjustment programs.
Regression 8 provides further support for this interpretation. In addition to the effective number of parties, in this regression we included a slope dummy that interacts with the effective number of parties, which takes a value of 1 when the government does not have majority in Congress, and 0 otherwise. Although the coefficients for the effective number of parties and the interactive term are not significant by themselves, a test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is 0 is rejected at the 1% significance level. It was not possible to reject a similar hypothesis for the case where the government does have a majority of seats in Congress.
The dummy for dictatorships did not have significant effects, once the share of government's seats in the legislature was accounted for. It is worth noting, however, that these two variables are highly correlated. When GOVSEATS was excluded, dictatorships did come out significant, and with a negative sign. Political instability and majority (not reported in the table) were not significant.
Elections, government changes, and the timing of devaluations 30
In addition to the more structural variables which can affect the choice of regime, the timing of shifts in exchange rate policy may also be affected by the timing of political events such as elections and changes in government. If there is in fact a political cost associated with devaluation, as suggested by Cooper (1971) , at no time should that cost be more salient than before elections. The run-up to an election is the time when the gap between the politician's discount rate and that of the public is at its peak, and governments may be willing to let the economy incur large costs in the long term (here the long term starts immediately after the election, or, at the most, after the change in government) in exchange for (real or apparent) benefits in the short run. In contrast, at no time should the political cost of devaluation be smaller than immediately after the transfer of government, as the incoming government can blame the outgoing government for making the devaluation necessary.
This has led to many episodes of electorally motivated delayed devaluation, among which are the Cruzado Plan in Brazil in 1986, the failed Primavera Plan in Argentina in 1989, and the 1994 Mexican Peso crisis. In the Cruzado plan, the exchange rate peg gave rise to mounting current account deficits. But "in the best Brazilian political tradition", according to Cardoso (1991) , corrective actions were placed on hold until right after the legislative elections. The main element of the Primavera plan was the reduction of the rate of crawl, in an attempt to moderate inflation in the run-up to the 1989 presidential elections (Heymann, 1991) . However, a speculative attack led to a sharp devaluation that ended the stabilization attempt before the elections, with disastrous electoral results for the ruling party. Regarding the Mexican experience in 1994, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) have noted that the skepticism over exchange rate commitments prevailing in Mexico in 1994 was compounded by the government's previous track record of devaluing in presidential election years.
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Why are devaluations politically costly? First, a devaluation can have a negative effect on real income, particularly in the short term. Devaluations affect real income through a variety of channels. On the one hand, by increasing the price of foreign goods relative to domestic goods, they increase the demand for domestic output. This is the substitution effect, which is expansionary. On the other hand, they reduce real wealth, provided that some of it is in domestic currency. This is a contractionary income effect. In addition, devaluations shift income from wage earners with high propensity to spend to profit recipients with low propensity to spend. As this shift involves many losers and few winners, it can be particularly costly around elections.
32 For a long time, it has been argued that in the case of developing countries, devaluations are contractionary (see Diaz Alejandro 1963, and Krugman and Taylor 1978) , which means that the income effect is larger than the substitution effect. The most recent empirical evidence is not conclusive, but it suggests that the effect is likely to be contractionary in the short term, while it is more neutral in the long term. 33 Before elections, naturally, the predominant focus is what happens in the short term. Streb (1998a, 1998b) identify another channel through which devaluations can be politically costly, in the context of a rational political budget cycle model in the Rogoff (1990) tradition. Voters dislike devaluation (which in the context of the one-sector model used by the authors, coincides with the rate of inflation) because it acts as a tax on money balances. Governments face a trade-off 31 Until 1994 the exact timing had been after elections, but before the change in government. In this way, the outgoing president would spare his successor (which was actually named by the incumbent) the political cost of devaluing. This pattern changed in 1994, where the devaluation occurred after the change in government. It has been argued that the impending election of president Salinas for the WTO 32 There are of course, other important channels through which a devaluation affects real income. For a comprehensive account of these, see Agenor and Montiel (1996) . 33 The counterpart of this is the expansionary effects associated with exchange rate based stabilizations in the short run, characterized by the real appreciation of the currency appreciation (see Kiguel and Liviathan, 199?) . This is one reason why stabilization programs that occur shortly before elections tend to be based on the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor (Stein and Streb, 1998a). between devaluation today and tomorrow, and, under incomplete information, they exploit this tradeoff for electoral purposes, using a low rate of devaluation before elections as a signal of their competence, thus increasing their chances of reelection. Hence, the pattern of devaluations around elections is part of a political budget cycle, a feature that has been overlooked in conventional stories of political budget cycles that concentrate on a closed economy. 34 The model in Stein and Streb (1998b) has very clear-cut empirical implications for the evolution of exchange rates around elections: governments do not always have incentives to manipulate exchange rates around elections. But when they do, it is always in the same direction: postponement of devaluations until after elections.
An alternative source of exchange rate movements in electoral years is the uncertainty regarding the results of elections, even if one ruled out manipulative theories. Not only is it uncertain who the winner will be. There is uncertainty as well regarding the policies each candidate would follow. In this case, however, the pattern of the exchange rate around elections is not as clear. Part of the devaluation could occur before the elections take place, reflecting the increased uncertainty, and the chances of the different candidates. After elections the exchange rate would appreciate or depreciate, depending on who the winner is and which economic policies are followed. In expected value, one should not expect a devaluation immediately after elections through this channel.
What does the existing evidence say? Apart from the evidence at an episodic level, there are a few more systematic empirical studies that look at the relationship between elections, changes in government, and the timing of devaluations. This incipient literature appears to support the hypothesis that devaluations tend to be delayed until after elections or government changes. Gavin and Perotti (1997) include in a recent study of fiscal policy in Latin America a section on the determinants of shifts in exchange rate regimes from fixed to flexible. They find that the likelihood that such a shift will occur increases significantly right after an election has taken place. Klein and Marion (1994) study the duration of exchange rate pegs to the US dollar for a sample of 17 Latin American countries in the period 1956-1991. In contrast with Gavin and Perotti, who focus only on regime shifts, these authors consider step devaluations as the end of a spell and the beginning of another. They find that the likelihood a peg will be abandoned increases immediately after an executive transfer. Edwards (1993) studies the timing of 39 large devaluations (15% or more) in democratic regimes, and finds that they tend to occur early on in the term in office. Edwards suggests that governments tend to follow the classic rule of "devalue immediately and blame it on your predecessors."
Here, our purpose is to extend the empirical literature regarding the pattern of nominal and real exchange rates around political events such as elections and changes in government. The data on elections and changes in government is based on the Enciclopedia Electoral Latinoamericana, coordinated by Nohlen (1992) , and on the Lijphart Elections Archive.
The evidence
The methodology we use is very simple. We study the pattern of nominal and real exchange rates around major political events (elections and government changes), by averaging the behavior of the relevant exchange rate variables around these events over all the episodes of each type. It is easier to describe the method followed with an example. Take, for instance, the pattern of the nominal exchange rate changes around elections. First, we pull together all election episodes in our database (there are 242 of them, counting both presidential and parliamentary elections). We consider the behavior of nominal exchange rates by looking through a 19-month window centered around elections. For each episode, month 0 corresponds to the month of the election, month -1 the month prior to the election, and so on. We then average, for each of the 19 months in the window (-9 through 9), the rate of nominal depreciation across all episodes. The average nominal rate of depreciation, month by month, is presented in Figure 1 .
The pattern in the figure is striking, and provides strong support to the hypothesis that devaluations are delayed until after elections. In months 2, 3 and 4 after an election, the average rate of nominal depreciation is 2 percentage points higher than it is for other months, and the average rate of depreciation is more than doubled. The larger effect occurs two months after the election. It should be stressed that we worked with geometric averages rather than arithmetic averages, in order to lessen the effects of outliers.
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The pattern is even stronger when only presidential elections are considered, as shown in figure 2. In this case, the average rate of nominal depreciation in month 2 reaches 7%, around 4.5 percentage points higher than in other months. The behavior of the nominal exchange rate around parliamentary (non-presidential) elections, in contrast, did not show any interesting pattern.
Are devaluations delayed until after elections, or after government changes? The previous pictures do not provide a clear answer, since different countries at different times have different lags between the dates of elections and those of government changes. Figure 3 shows the behavior of the nominal exchange rate around changes in government. It is clear from the picture that the most relevant event is the change in government. In this case, all the effect is concentrated in month 1, and the depreciation at this time is around 5.5 percentage points higher than in other months. It seems clear that the fact that devaluations occur 2-4 months after elections is a reflection of the fact that the lag between the election and the change in government in most cases is between 1 and three months. This suggests that, while in some cases such as Mexico pre-1994, the outgoing government implemented the devaluation, in most cases the incumbent does not want to endure the political cost of the devaluation, even once the election has taken place. An interesting topic for future research is whether the pattern differs for the cases where the government is followed by another government of the same party.
In figure 4 , we restricted the episodes to constitutional government changes. The effect is even stronger: the average devaluation one month after elections is now greater than 10%, and around 7 percentage points higher than in other months. The effects for the case of non-constitutional changes in government are much smaller (see figure 5) . Interestingly, in this case the depreciation starts in month 0, which would suggest that, at least in some cases, the changes in government are endogenous to exchange rate crises. This is a matter which, again, is left for future research.
The real exchange rate shows a similar pattern. In this case, to make the level of the exchange rate comparable across countries, we normalized the real exchange rate in each country so that the (geometric) average would be 100. For the purposes of the figures, we normalized the month by month averages so that they would be 100 at time 0 (the date of election or government change). Figure 6 shows the pattern of the real exchange rate around presidential elections. There is a gradual 3% appreciation in the months preceding an election, followed by a much steeper depreciation after elections have taken place. As with the nominal exchange rate, the real depreciation, which totals 6%, occurs in months 2 through 4. From month 5 onwards, the real exchange rate returns to the pattern of gradual appreciation. As with the nominal exchange rate, the pattern is even more crystal-clear around constitutional government changes (see figure 7) . In this case, most of the depreciation (almost 7%) occurs in month 1, and the appreciation resumes in month 3.
The preceding figures show a very clear picture of the average behavior of nominal and real exchange rates around major political events. However, it is interesting as well to know something about the distribution of the behavior of exchange rate around these events. In order to see this, we make the following experiment: at any given time, we calculate from the data the probability that the real exchange rate will appreciate or depreciate by certain pre-specified amounts during the following six months. These probabilities are presented in the first column of table 5. The last figure in the column indicates that, at any point in time, the probability of a real depreciation of 25% or more within the next six months is 3.84%.
Next, we ask how these probabilities change around major political events. More specifically, what are these probabilities if there is a constitutional government change sometime between t+1 and t+5? We would expect that having a government change in the middle will increase the probability of a large real depreciation. The probabilities, which appear in column 2 of the table, confirm our priors. The probability of a large real depreciation of at least 25% is now close to 10%. Thus, the change in government increases the probability of a large devaluation by a factor of 2.5.
How do these probabilities change when there is a presidential election immediately after t+6? (more precisely, if the election occurs between t+7 and t+10). The resulting probabilities are listed in column 3. An impending presidential election, as expected, reduces the probability of a large real depreciation by more than 30%. The most interesting comparison, however, is between columns 2 and 3 in the table. Compared to the "impending presidential election" situation, the "recently inaugurated constitutional government" case is 3.7 times more likely to have produced a large real depreciation (of 25% or more). In contrast, the "impending election" scenario is 2.4 times more likely to have produced a real appreciation (larger than 5%).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the political economy determinants of exchange rate policy in Latin America. We have found that political economy factors have played a role in shaping exchange rate policy. In particular, we find evidence that governments with strong support in the legislature tend to choose fixed regimes, as do governments that face a fragmented opposition. This is in line with idea that sustaining a fixed rate may require politically difficult fiscal adjustment, and that strong governments are in a better position to engineer such adjustment. At the same time, it may be capturing the fact that governments with strong support in Congress suffer a smaller political cost in case of devaluation.
Economies with an important manufacturing sector are more prone to adopt either floating regimes or backward-looking crawling pegs, both of which tend to deliver more competitive exchange rates. The influence of the manufacturing sector on the exchange regime appears more important in periods where trade was liberalized, so that this sector had to face the competition of foreign producers. This result is complemented by similar findings in country studies by Ghezzi and Pasco Font (1998) for Peru, and Jaramillo, Steiner and Salazar (1998) for the case of Colombia.
Finally, we also find strong evidence that major political events such as elections and government changes affect the path of nominal and real exchange rates. More specifically, devaluations tend to be delayed in the run-up to elections, and only occur immediately after the new government takes office. 
